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Abstract 
European Union (EU) enlargement of the mid-2000s is likely to have changed the motives for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) location between the existing Member States (the EU15) and the new entrants 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), but it is poorly understood.  This paper uses the framework of 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and data for 35,105 foreign investments in Europe to not only examine if 
the motives differ between these, but how they are affected by the enlargement.  Three asset-exploiting 
motives of market, resource and efficiency seeking are explored using a conditional logit model for the 
location choice.  This is separately for greenfield and brownfield FDI, involving new facilities or jobs, 
where the latter is efficiency seeking from an expansion or a co-location of functions.  The paper finds 
greenfield FDI in the CEECs seeks an export-platform for the EU market and a low-skilled workforce, 
but a national market and higher skills in the EU15.  Brownfield FDI differs from this for expansions 
only, for which the EU market is important, reflecting scale economies.  Surprisingly, EU enlargement 
has a much stronger effect on the FDI location motives in the EU15 by increasing the importance of 
the European market, which is possibly because the CEEC liberalization was ongoing throughout the 
accession process. The paper finds evidence that the differences in the motives between the CEECs 
and EU15 are narrowing over time, but they are pronounced and it is argued they will persist. 
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The Motives for FDI Location in Europe and EU Enlargement 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Multinational enterprise (MNE) activity from foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown at a 
faster rate than other international transactions, and leading to renewed interest in its location 
(Blonigen 2005).  In Europe, FDI is driven by integration (see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 
2006), of which a key event is the fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU) in the mid-
2000s (Brülhart et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2018).  This sought to integrate the ten Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) into this union, liberalizing their economies (De Smidt, 
1992; Disdier and Mayer, 2004) and through lower trade costs changing the relationship with 
the fifteen existing EU Member States (‘EU15’).1  Enlargement is likely to affect the motives 
for FDI location in the both new and old EU Member States (Krugman and Venables, 1990), 
but it is relatively poorly understood.  Much of the existing evidence is prior to enlargement 
or for a single country, while the cross-country studies tend to be piecemeal and are either for 
the CEECs or the EU15 (e.g., Demekes et al., 2007; Pusterla and Resmini, 2007). 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore differences in the motives for FDI location in 
the CEECs and EU15 countries, and to examine the roles played by the EU enlargement and 
greater integration from economic, political and trade liberalization.  The framework for this 
is the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1988, 2001) that is given effect by the asset-exploiting 
motives of market, resource and efficiency seeking (Buckley et al., 2007).  The first two of 
these motives are explored for greenfield FDI, which is in the form of new start-ups, and the 
latter for brownfield FDI at an MNE’s existing site in the host country.  This is either as an 
expansion in the plant’s primary function or a co-location of different functions at the same 
 
1 The CEECs are the Eastern Bloc countries west of the former Soviet Union, plus the Baltic States.  Slovenia is 
part of the fifth enlargement and included, but Cyprus and Malta that joined in 2004 are not. 
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site, where respectively these are efficiency gains from economies of scale and scope (Cui et 
al., 2014).  In the international business literature, brownfield FDI tends to be used for the 
foreign takeover of domestically-owned plants (Cheng, 2009), but in our case it is associated 
with new facilities or jobs, possibly as a result of a takeover, which Meyer and Estrin (2001) 
define as ‘brownfield acquisitions’.  Our definition is used by Král (2004), and it corresponds 
with the planning literature, where a brownfield site is land or buildings that is developed but 
not in full use (Alker et al., 2010).  Importantly, as Dunning (2000) argues, it is sequential to 
the market and resource motives, so that it is believed to capture efficiency seeking. 
 The FDI data give details of 35,105 greenfield and brownfield cross-border projects 
locating in the CEECs and EU15 (the 'EU25') over 1997-2010, including periods before and 
after the fifth EU enlargement.  Terms are used to capture the market and resource motive, 
while data are also collected for enlargement and liberalization, as well as for agglomeration, 
macroeconomic and industry variables, reflecting the heterodox nature of Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm (McCann and Mudambi, 2005).  The location choice is analyzed using conditional 
logit models, by regressing these variables across the EU25 countries for each of greenfield 
and brownfield FDI.  In this latter case, the market and resource terms reveal the location of 
this efficiency-seeking FDI.  The statistical significance of the market and resource motives 
is examined, which is both from zero and between the CEECs and EU15. 
Overall, the results reveal that there are significant differences in the FDI location 
motives between the CEECs and EU15.  Greenfield FDI in the CEECs is consistent with its 
location as an export-platform for the main European market, but in the EU15 it seeks a large 
national market size and the higher-quality resources of an educated workforce.  Brownfield 
expansions seek the European market in the CEECs and EU15, but co-locations have similar 
motives to greenfield FDI.  Enlargement has a strong effect on the motives in the EU15 only, 
making the European market and a less highly-skilled workforce more attractive, whereas the 
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locations in the CEECs that are further to the east increase in importance.  Liberalization was 
ongoing in the CEECs and this may explain the weaker effect of enlargement.  The difference 
in the motives seems to be narrowing over time, but it is argued that it will persist. 
The next section sets out the framework and hypotheses.  Sections 3 and 4 outline the 
model, data and variables, and Section 5 presents the results.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and the Location Motives 
 
2.1. The Eclectic Paradigm and Literature Review 
 
There is a growing use of the international business literature in economic geography (see 
Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Jones, 2018), for which the eclectic paradigm is the most influential 
framework for examining FDI determinants (Stoian and Filippaios, 2008).  According to this, 
FDI occurs if a firm has ownership, internalization and location advantages (Dunning, 1988, 
2001) and it is given effect by the asset-exploiting motives of market, resource and efficiency 
seeking (Buckley et al., 2007).  Market-seeking FDI circumvents trade barriers or it exploits 
new markets; resource-seeking investment secures a stable or low-cost supply of resources; 
and efficiency seeking improves a firm’s operations (Dunning, 2000).  A fourth motive that is 
known as strategic-asset seeking (see Li et al., 2012) is not explored, since our FDI data are 
not linked at the MNE level, so that industry linkage terms help control for this. 
The empirical analysis is structured around three hypotheses.  The first two examine 
the motives for greenfield and brownfield FDI and the third considers enlargement.  All three 
make a contribution since only a small number of studies include both the CEECs and EU15, 
but even these may not take a pan-European perspective, including Spies (2010) on German 
unification and Ascani et al. (2016) on Italian FDI in EU candidate countries.  Other studies 
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are prior to the enlargement, such as Disdier and Mayer (2004), who examine the location of 
French FDI in Europe over 1980-99.  They find that agglomeration economies matter for the 
EU15 and the national market size and distance from the host country for the CEECs, but 
they do not consider proximity to the EU market.2  More broadly, many FDI studies are for a 
single country, while the piecemeal nature of this literature makes it difficult to compare the 
importance of the FDI location motives between the CEECs and the EU15, and to know if 
they are statistically different.  Not only do the studies differ in the countries, but in the FDI 
data, the variables, their measurement, the controls, the time period and estimation technique.  
All of these condition the results, but importantly they are held constant in our study. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis I: Market and Resource Motives and Greenfield FDI 
 
Eight CEECs acceded to the European Union in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 
2007, although the integration of these economies with the EU15 had been ongoing since the 
mid-1990s.3  Association Agreements were signed by each CEEC with the EU that removed 
tariffs on CEEC industrial goods (Baltagi et al., 2007), and product standards and regulations 
were phased out over time.  The accession negotiations commenced in 1998 and lasted up to 
seven years (Christoffersen, 2007), with FDI in the CEECs increasing greatly during this time 
(Resmini, 2000; Jones et al., 2018).  The eclectic paradigm argues that the lower tariffs will 
make a country less attractive to market-seeking FDI, but integration raises the possibility of 
a third-country effect, since the EU15 has over 90 per cent of EU GDP, and FDI might locate 
 
2 Existing research also emphasizes agglomeration economies, for the CEECs (Boudier-Bensebaa, 2005; Hilber 
and Voicu, 2010) and the EU15, where foreign-owned firms are more important than domestic firms (Basile et 
al., 2008; Guimarães et al., 2000).  Nielsen et al. (2017) survey the literature, and market size has a positive 
effect on FDI in 85 of 115 studies.  This is similar for the resource motives of human capital and infrastructure, 
although ambiguous for wages and taxes that may be due to correlation with unobserved factors.  However, the 
survey includes non-European locations and it does not distinguish between the CEECs and EU15.   
3 Negotiations started in 1998 for Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, but about two years 
later for Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, of which the first three were able to ‘catch-up’. 
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in the CEECs to take advantage of their good access to this market.  The notion of an export-
platform is well-established in the international economics literature (Neary, 2008), and it is 
consistent with the core-periphery new economic geography model (Krugman and Venables, 
1990).  It suggests that lower congestion and transport costs in the CEECs will be important 
to facilitate exports, but that the national market size and linkages are less important. 
 
Hypothesis Ia: Greenfield FDI in the CEECs is an export-platform for the European market 
that seeks EU25 market access, but national markets are important for the EU15. 
 
Underlying the export-platform are the resources of the CEECs that are either not available in 
the EU15 or at such a low cost, like low-skilled labour (see Pusterla and Resmini, 2007).  As 
such, whereas ‘general assets’ in the form of low-skills will be important for FDI location in 
the CEECs, FDI in the EU15 will be attracted by higher-skills that reflect ‘specific assets’, 
like technological capabilities, management expertise and organizational abilities (Iammarino 
and McCann, 2013).  However, flexible labour markets that imply less-costly hiring or firing, 
and lower taxes are likely to be attractive to FDI location throughout the EU25. 
 
Hypothesis Ib: Greenfield FDI in the CEECs seeks cheap, low-skilled labour, but high-skills 
in the EU15, while flexible labour markets and lower taxes are important for both. 
 
2.3. Hypothesis II: The Efficiency-Seeking Motive and Brownfield FDI 
 
Efficiency seeking is explored for brownfield FDI, which is a re-investment at an existing site 
that is an expansion in the plant’s main function or a co-location of different functions.  These 
give rise to economies of scale or scope (Cui et al., 2014), where in the latter case the MNE 
takes advantage of ancillary capabilities, such as in technical, computing or transport services 
(Defever, 2006).  Franco et al. (2010) argue that efficiency seeking is vague since it includes 
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activities that are resource seeking, such as the fragmentation of production into ‘global value 
chains’, but Bevan and Estrin (2004) emphasize the definition that is used here.  Its sequential 
nature means brownfield FDI is consistent with efficiency seeking (Dunning, 2000). 
Brownfield FDI is little explored in the literature, although broadly defined, Rascuite 
and Downward (2017) explore it for EU15 investment in the EU25.  They find heterogeneity 
in FDI location related to the market size and labour availability, but again it is not examined 
separately for the CEECs and EU15, which could underlie this.  Expansions are important in 
the context of integration since in the CEECs and EU15 they allow an MNE to consolidate its 
activities to achieve economies of scale (Neary, 2008).  This could arise from the closure of 
an existing facility, possibly outside the EU25, or the location of an investment at an existing 
rather than a new site, but in either case access to the EU market will be important.  Whether 
it locates in the CEECs or EU15 will depend on the same resources as in Hypothesis Ib. 
 
Hypothesis IIa: Brownfield FDI from expansions seeks locations with EU25 market access in 
both the CEECs and EU15, but resource seeking is like greenfield FDI.   
 
European market access will matter less for co-locations since they improve the operational 
efficiency of a plant by combining functions.  The resource requirement is less certain as this 
depends on the functions being combined.  In the absence of other evidence, the belief is that 
the location of the co-location projects will be no different to that of greenfield FDI. 
 
Hypothesis IIb: Brownfield co-locations are driven by the same motives as greenfield FDI. 
 
2.4. Hypothesis III: EU Enlargement and FDI Location 
 
There is little empirical evidence on how EU enlargement affects the FDI location motives, 
but as FDI grew strongly in the CEECs after liberalization (Resmini, 2000) then a reasonable 
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hypothesis is that enlargement will accentuate the importance of the location motives found 
for greenfield FDI in Hypothesis I, i.e., a given market size leads to more FDI location, and 
so on.  This is consistent with Kosteletou and Liargovas (2000), who find that EU integration 
increased export-orientated FDI in the CEECs.  In the case of the EU15, lower border costs 
after enlargement could promote the importance of the EU25 market relative to the national 
market, but for investors that still seek higher-level skills in these countries. 
 
Hypothesis IIIa: EU enlargement makes the CEECs more attractive to greenfield FDI as an 
export-platform for the European market, and for cheap, low-skilled labour. In the EU15 
the European market is also more important, but for high-skilled labour.   
 
In addition to the enlargement itself, the liberalization of the CEECs was on-going, since the 
accession criteria required the CEECs to guarantee democracy and the rule of law before the 
negotiations could start and to have a functioning market economy in place by membership 
(Christoffersen, 2007).  A key event in this respect was a commitment to enlarge made by the 
European Council of Ministers up to three years prior to membership, since this reduced the 
investment risk by ensuring the liberalization of the CEECs (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Jones 
et al., 2018).  Conversely, political liberalization may have made them less attractive to FDI 
as investors could prefer less-serious risks, such as a weak regulatory regime (see Bevan and 
Estrin, 2004).  Further, while the eclectic paradigm predicts the removal of the border checks 
increased trade and makes FDI less attractive, Carstensen and Toubal (2004) find that trade 
and FDI are in fact complementary in the CEECs prior to the EU enlargement. 
 
Hypothesis IIIb: Greater economic liberalization increases greenfield FDI in the CEECs, but 
political and trade liberalization have an uncertain effect and could diminish it. 
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3. The Empirical Model 
 
The relationship between the profits ijt earnt on an investment i in country j  K = (‘EU25’) 
at time t and the location attributes is linearized as: ijt = Xijt + ijt, where Xijt are observable 
attributes and ijt is unobserved investor-specific characteristics.  This kind of relationship can 
be derived from a rich base in theory, but for a smaller set of variables (e.g., Head and Mayer, 
2004; Basile et al., 2008).  While empirically-based, it is reasonable for exploring the market 
and resource motives since these affect an investor’s revenue and costs, and therefore profits.  
The hypotheses are examined statistically by writing:  Xijt  Mh Mijt + Rh Rijt + I Iijt + C 
Cijt, where M and R are market and resource motives (h = CEEC and EU15), I are integration 
terms and C are controls.  The  parameters are estimated in a single regression for the EU25, 
which is for greenfield and brownfield FDI for Hypotheses I and II respectively.  It is tested 
if the parameters are different from zero (i.e., MCEEC = 0, MEU15 = 0, RCEEC = 0 and REU15 = 
0) and if they differ from each other (MCEEC = MEU15 and RCEEC = REU15).  For Hypothesis 
III it is also examined if the equalities differ before and after the EU enlargement. 
Based on utility maximization, the conditional logit model (CLM) links site selection 
by a profit-maximizing firm to the location attributes.  The location choice is modelled by 
letting Pijt denote the probability that the foreign investment locates in country j, i.e., Pr (ijt > 
ikt), where j  K and for all k  j.  Since ijt = Xijt + ijt, then by substitution, Pr ((Xijt - Xikt) 
> ijt - ikt), and if ijt follows a Gumbel distribution, then (McFadden, 1974): 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  =  
exp 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
∑ exp 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗∈𝐽
.     (1) 
 
The coefficient  (i.e., Mh, Rh, I and C) gives the log-odds ratio of choosing country j over 
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not choosing j in K.  It is estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function L across the 
EU25, where dijt is unity if a project i locates in country j at time t, but zero otherwise: 
 
ln 𝐿 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗𝑖 .               (2) 
 
The CLM embodies the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) that imposes a uniform 
substitutability between each country pair, but it can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates 
(see Head et al., 1995).4  A popular way to address this is a nested logit model (NLM), which 
estimates the correlation in the error term due to the unobserved characteristics (Basile et al., 
2008).  Disdier and Mayer (2004) nest the location choice between the CEECs and EU15, but 
find it diminishes over 1991-99, which they attribute to the liberalization of the CEECs.  The 
NLM is outlined in the Appendix, although in the analysis below we do not reject the IIA. 
 
4. Data and Variables 
 
The FDI data are sourced from the Ernst and Young, European Investment Monitor (EIM), 
which gives details of cross-border investment at the project level.  It includes FDI from any 
source in all EU countries at 2007, excluding Cyprus and Malta.5  The EIM gives the location 
choice of greenfield and brownfield investments that lead to new facilities or gross jobs.  It 
identifies the industry, function, country of origin and scale, although investment expenditure 
is known only for a third of cases and the number of jobs for two-thirds.  To compile the data, 
Ernst and Young (2012) claim to monitor 20,000 outlets and contact the majority of firms to 
validate the data.  Notwithstanding some definitional differences, the correlation between the 
 
4 From equation (1), Pl / Pm depends on the characteristics of countries l and m only, but it is unreasonable if l or 
m are close substitutes for some third country, since the odds-ratio is affected by its presence. 
5 It also excludes portfolio investment and license agreements, as well as retail, leisure facilities, hotels, utilities, 
extraction, real estate and not-for-profit organizations.  It includes joint ventures, but mainly in the EU15. 
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EIM and UNCTAD FDI data is 0.90 by country and year.  The number of brownfield cases is 
similar to Rascuite and Downward (2017), who use the Bureau van Dijk FDI data. 
 The EIM dataset identifies 35,105 FDI projects over 1997-2010, of which a third are 
brownfield FDI (see Table 1).  A half of projects locate in three EU15 countries (8,343 in the 
UK, 6,022 in France and 3,491 in Germany) and a fifth locate in the CEECs (6,880 projects).6 
Table 1 shows that 58% of projects are in manufacturing and 30% in services, but excluding 
personal services, such as education & health, retail & hospitality and transport.7  Four-fifths 
of the brownfield projects are expansions, which is similar for the CEECs and EU15, but they 
are more likely to be in manufacturing (Table 1).  About half the projects originate from the 
EU15, 34% from the Americas and 12% from Asia.  Figure 1 shows that FDI increases in the 
CEECs after enlargement in 2004, but it is more pronounced for the EU15.  Indeed, Figure 2 
shows that manufacturing and service FDI have each trended upwards in the EU15. 
 
< TABLE 1 AND FIGURES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
To distinguish expansions from co-locations the EIM identifies ten primary functions of the 
FDI projects.  Overall, 35% of the functions are in production, 35% sales and marketing, 8% 
headquarters and 7% R&D.  These are 29%, 39%, 10% and 8% for the EU15, but 60%, 20%, 
1% and 5% for the CEECs.  Other functions are service-based, but small in number: logistics 
(8% EU15; 7% CEECs), contact centres (3%; 2%), testing and servicing (2%; 2%), shared 
services (1%; 2%), education and training (0.5%; 0.5%) and data centres (0.5%; 0.5%). 
 
 
 
 
6 4,707 projects are in the Visegrád group (Poland, 1,613; Hungary, 1,413; Czech Republic, 1,152 and Slovakia, 
529), 654 in the Baltic States (Lithuania, 239; Estonia, 234; and Latvia, 181) and 1,401 in the 2007 entrants.   
7 It excludes services tied directly to the market, but similar results are found for all services in Table 2 below. 
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4.1. Market and Resource Variables 
 
The terms for the market (M) and resource (R) motives are chosen to address the hypotheses, 
and they are motivated by the literature.  The discussion of these terms is necessarily concise, 
but greater detail can be found in Serwicka et al. (2014).  The measurement of the variables, 
including the I terms, is given in Appendix Table A, together with the expected signs and the 
means.  Correlation coefficients are presented in Appendix Table B and are reasonable.8 
In the manner of Harris (1954), market seeking at the European level is captured by a 
gravity-weighted market potential term, which quantifies the centrality / peripherality of each 
country location.  For country j it is the sum of GDP for all other (K =) EU25 countries: 
 
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡 =  ∑
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑑𝑗𝑘𝑟𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾,𝑗≠𝑘 .     (3) 
 
Since roads are the popular method for moving goods in the EU it is weighted by the distance 
djk between the respective capital cities, using the AA Route Planner.  To allow for the intra-
country distance it is also weighted by the country size rk (i.e., radius of a disk with the same 
area).  An alternative measure used by Head and Mayer (2004) performs less well. 
Market demand at a national level is measured by country real GDP and the forward-
looking nature of FDI by the GDP growth rate (see Head and Mayer, 2004; Procher, 2011).  
As a measure of urbanization the population density indirectly captures market potential, but 
a negative sign means that the market is congested and exporting is difficult.  The motorway 
density is likely to be correlated with other physical infrastructure, but it is added for the ease 
of access, for which a positive sign is expected (Keeble et al., 1988).  Some studies include 
per capita income in place of GDP (e.g., Resmini, 2000), but as a market-based explanation it 
 
8 The exception is the national market size and wage rate, but other estimates are robust to each of these. 
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is problematic since it could reflect the productivity of resources.  Indeed, it is correlated with 
both market and resource terms (motorway density: +0.62; wage rate: +0.65).  Further, given 
that the areal size of the country is included in the controls (see below), then it is not possible 
to include per capita income as it means unscrambling four coefficients from three estimates, 
while including per capita income on its own gives an implausible negative estimate.9 
On the resource seeking, high- and semi-skilled labour are proxied by the educational 
attainment rate of the working-age population at each of the tertiary and secondary levels.  A 
positive estimate for these, especially the former, is consistent with investors seeking specific 
assets (Iammarino and McCann, 2013).  Unskilled labour is the share of the workforce that is 
educated at neither of these levels, so that its effect is inferred from negative estimates for the 
two education terms.  Production costs are measured by the manufacturing wage rate.  There 
is some ambiguity about the role of the unemployment rate (Basile et al., 2008), but as labour 
availability is likely to be reflected in a lower wage rate, then like Disdier and Mayer (2004) 
it is interpreted as capturing a rigid labour market, for which a negative sign is expected.  The 
tax rate is added as it affects the post-tax investment return (Procher, 2011).  As the areal size 
is included it does not capture the benefit of public goods (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). 
 
4.2. Integration and Control Terms 
 
The I terms include terms for two integration events.  The first is for the EU membership that 
removed the border checks and lowered trade costs.  The second is for the European Council 
commitment to enlargement that ensured the liberalization of the CEECs under the accession 
criteria.  These are unity for the year of the event and all years afterwards, but zero otherwise.  
 
9 Using obvious notation, we regress: a ln GDP + b ln (POP / AREA) + c ln AREA, plus other terms, which is: a 
ln GDP + b ln POP + (c - b) ln AREA.  Excluding ln AREA, by setting c = 0, gives an identical functional form: 
 ln GDP +  ln POP +  ln AREA.  However, the constraint  = - (= -b) is rejected by the data, suggesting that 
the b coefficient is biased when the AREA term is omitted, while all other estimates are unchanged as  = a. 
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Since integration is on-going terms are also included for each of economic, political and trade 
liberalization.  The first is captured by the real effective exchange rate.  Since its denominator 
is the consumer price index it picks-up a loss of competitiveness from higher inflation.  The 
second is measured by a composite political risk index that weights twelve indicators, and as 
serious risks do not vary much it captures less-serious risks.10  Finally, the trade liberalization 
from the tariff reductions is picked-up by the volume of trade relative to GDP. 
 As controls, agglomeration terms from industrial linkages are included for each of the 
foreign and domestic sectors, where the former is based on the number of FDI projects in the 
previous period and the latter on employment data (see Appendix Table A).  A Jacobs term is 
added for industrial diversity for the linkages that go across industries (Jones, 2017), as well 
as a market structure term for the ease of entry into an industry.  EU Structural Funds might 
attract FDI (Basile et al., 2008), but these could just signal that a country is under-developed.  
The absolute change in the exchange rate is included for market volatility that may deter FDI, 
and Euro currency membership is added, which like the trade term has an ambiguous effect. 
FDI varies much more strongly across countries than over time, and this lack of within-group 
variation makes country-level fixed effects inappropriate, like other studies (e.g., Disdier and 
Mayer, 2004; Spies, 2010).  Finally, as noted above, the areal size term (AREA) captures the 
benefit of a country’s pure public goods.  Crucially, it also ensures that the population density 
term is correctly determined, while leaving other estimates unchanged (see note 9). 
 
5. The Results 
 
The model is regressed for j = 25 countries and t = 14 years from 1997 to 2010.  All terms are 
lagged a year, except for the pre-announced membership and Euro terms.  Initially, the NLM 
 
10 It includes measures for government stability, investment profile, socioeconomic conditions, internal conflict, 
external conflict, bureaucratic quality, corruption, religious tensions, ethnic tensions, military influence, law and 
order, and democratic accountability, giving greater weight to the first five of these (Busse and Hefeker, 2007). 
 14 
was regressed for greenfield FDI, nested according to the EU15 and CEECs, but these results 
invalidate the utility maximization foundation of the logit model.11  This is also the case if the 
CEECs are nested by the 2004 and 2007 entrants, implying that Bulgaria and Romania are 
not close substitutes for each other.  A similar result is found for Estonia and the other Baltic 
States.  In both cases, the countries are in different language families, suggesting that cultural 
differences are important (see Mudambi and Navarra, 2002).  After experimentation a nesting 
structure was found that is consistent with the logit model, but these estimates imply that the 
errors are uncorrelated.12  Disdier and Mayer (2004) find a diminishing ‘West-East’ nesting 
effect prior to enlargement, while it could also be that the large number of variables included 
in this study capture the differences in FDI location between the CEECs and EU15.  
 
5.1. Hypothesis I: Market and Resource Motives and Greenfield FDI 
 
The results from regressing the CLM for greenfield FDI are presented in Table 2.  The first 
column is for all FDI, and the second and third columns are for manufacturing and services.  
Many coefficients are significant as the large number of observations means the estimates are 
better determined with smaller confidence intervals.  Two significance tests are presented: the 
difference from zero (e.g., MCEEC = 0 and MEU15 = 0); and in square brackets the difference 
between the CEECs and EU15 (MCEEC = MEU15).13  Of the other terms, the integration terms 
are discussed below, but agglomeration, foreign and domestic specialization all increase FDI, 
and more so in the EU15.  Industrial diversity has no effect, but a concentrated market deters 
 
11 The estimates of the dissimilarity parameter were greater than unity at 4.42 and 3.68 for the EU15 and CEECs 
(standard errors of 0.26 and 0.31), and 4.09, 2.75 and 4.48 for the EU15 and 2004 and 2007 EU entrants. 
12 The nests reflect economic, geographical and language similarities, but dissimilarity parameter estimates are 
close to unity: France, Germany and UK (estimate of 1.19), Low Countries (0.78), Scandinavia (1.05), Southern 
Europe (0.89), Visegrád (1.32) and other Slavic (1.69), plus single-country degenerate branches for Austria, 
Estonia and Romania.  If language dummies are included, only the Germanic language family is significant, but 
it gives perverse results, so that these dummies are not included below. 
13 The latter involves estimating the terms for the EU25 (e.g., MCEEC+EU15) and by including slope dummies on 
the terms for the CEECs (i.e., MCEEC) to examine if they differ significantly between the CEECs and EU15. 
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FDI and the areal size has a positive effect.  Like these, other terms have expected signs. 
 
< TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
To interpret the results for the market (M) and resource (R) terms the marginal effects for the 
probability of FDI location with respect to each term are evaluated in Table 3, where each is 
expressed as an elasticity.  The table also presents the marginal effects for the NLM, but they 
are similar to the CLM, which is expected given the above.  The elasticities are based on the 
results shown in Table 2, but qualitatively similar estimates are found for the parsimonious 
version.  The M and R estimates are now considered in relation to Hypothesis I. 
Hypothesis Ia: The results in Tables 2 and 3 do not reject this hypothesis.  They show 
that FDI in the CEECs is an export-platform for the EU25 as the European market potential 
elasticity is significant and greater than two.  Other estimates support this, as the population 
density and motorway terms reveal that the investors seek an uncongested location with good 
access, consistent with exporting.  Further, the European market potential is significantly less 
important for FDI location in the EU15 as the elasticity is a third of that for the CEECs, while 
the population density is insignificant and the national market size is positive and significant.  
Similar results are obtained for manufacturing FDI, except only the European market matters.  
The market motives are insignificant for service FDI in the CEECs, but these are essentially 
producer services, while the importance of the national market for service FDI in the EU15 is 
likely to reflect its more-localized nature and it is found by Jones and Wren (2016). 
Hypothesis Ib: The results in Tables 2 and 3 do not reject this hypothesis.  The wage 
rate exerts a negative and significant effect on greenfield FDI in the CEECs, as do both of the 
education terms, implying a preference for low-skilled labour.  In the EU15, both education 
terms are positive and they differ significantly from the CEECs, such that resource seeking in 
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the EU15 is about skilled labour.  Indeed, the elasticity for tertiary education is nearly three-
times greater than that of secondary education in the EU15.  Nevertheless, costs still matter as 
lower wages are important in the EU15, while as expected a lower corporate tax rate and less-
rigid labour market are significant for both the CEECs and EU15.  Similar results are found 
for manufacturing FDI, for which the linkages with domestic firms are weaker in the CEECs, 
further supporting the export-platform hypothesis.  For service FDI, Table 2 shows domestic 
linkages are more important, consistent with producer services, while the positive wage effect 
could be a substitution effect since it is measured for the manufacturing industry only. 
It is not practical to regress the data to allow for the characteristics of the FDI using a 
multi-nominal logit model since there are a large number of countries and a space constraint 
prevents us from setting out the new model.  However, Appendix Table C estimates the CLM 
for manufacturing FDI from the EU25 only and it finds similar results.  This is also the case 
if the southern EU or three large EU15 recipients of FDI are not included as hosts. 
 
5.2. Hypothesis II: The Efficiency-Seeking Motive and Brownfield FDI 
 
Brownfield FDI location is conditional on the location of a MNE’s existing plants, but since 
these investments could alternatively be carried out as greenfield FDI, the model is regressed 
across all EU25 countries.  Any resulting bias is likely to be small since it is regressed across 
a large number of location choices.  Table 4 gives the results from jointly regressing the CLM 
for the expansions and co-locations, allowing the estimates of the market (M) and resource 
(R) terms to differ between the CEECs and EU15.  The elasticities are again given in Table 3.  
With the exception of the accession terms, the I and C estimates are qualitatively the same as 
Table 2 and so not reported.  A similar pattern is found for production in Appendix Table D, 
but if the other functions are considered then the estimates are largely insignificant. 
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< TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Hypothesis IIa: The results for expansions support the hypothesis for the market motive only.  
European market potential has a positive effect on the location of expansion projects that is 
not significantly different between the CEECs and EU15.  In either case the elasticity of two 
is greater than that for the national market, and good motorway access and a lower population 
density also matter for both, especially the CEECs.  The importance of the European market 
is consistent with the significant EU membership term, reflecting lower border costs.  While 
not tested directly, the quality of the resource requirement is lower than that found in Table 3 
for greenfield FDI since a less-educated workforce has a larger effect on FDI location in the 
CEECs, and a more-educated workforce has a smaller effect for the EU15. 
Hypothesis IIb: The results for co-locations support the hypothesis for the EU15 only.  
The co-location estimates are similar to greenfield FDI, except that the national market and 
higher-skilled labour are even more important for FDI location in the EU15 (Table 3), while 
in the CEECs the motive terms are generally insignificant.  This could arise from the smaller 
number of observations on the co-locations (Table 1), while there is greater heterogeneity, as 
there are ninety possible combinations of the functions, compared with ten for the expansions 
that are in the same function.  Similar results are found for co-locations involving production 
(Appendix Table D).  The commitment to enlarge term in Table 4 indicates that liberalization 
rather than the lower border costs are important for the co-location investments. 
 
5.3. Hypothesis III: EU Enlargement and FDI Location 
 
The European Council commitment to enlarge term is significant in Table 2, so that this is 
interacted with the market and resource terms to explore the effect of EU enlargement.  Since 
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there is no single date for this event then the year 2004 is used for the EU15.  The results for 
greenfield FDI are given in Table 5.  These are qualitatively the same if instead the location 
motive terms are interacted with EU membership or if 2002 is used for the EU15.  The other 
liberalization terms are estimated for the period as a whole, since these are ongoing. 
 
< TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Hypothesis IIIa: This hypothesis is refuted for the CEECs, but not for the EU15.  The results 
in Table 5 show that just three of the ten motive terms differ at the five per cent significance 
level for the CEECs after enlargement, but every motive differs for the EU15, which is nearly 
always at the one per cent level.14  In the CEECs, European market potential is less important 
for FDI location after enlargement and significantly so for manufacturing (Appendix Table 
D).  Unskilled labour is also less important, as captured by the less negative education terms, 
while there is a strong negative estimate on the wage rate.  These estimates are explained by 
investors in the CEECs trading market access after enlargement for low-cost locations further 
to the east.15  In the EU15, the structural break in the location motives is consistent with the 
strong upward trend in greenfield FDI from 2004 in Figure 1, which is more pronounced than 
for the CEECs.  It does not reflect the service FDI growth shown in Figure 2, since it is found 
for manufacturing FDI in Appendix Table D.16  In contrast to the CEECs, it is locations in the 
EU15 that have good European market access that are more important after enlargement, and 
the quality of labour is also more important, particularly skilled labour.  
Hypothesis IIIb: This hypothesis is not refuted by the results.  Economic liberalization 
increases the probability of location in the EU25, but Table 5 shows that political and trade 
 
14 The likelihood ratio test for a break in all ten terms is 274.2; 20.01, 10 = 23.2. 
15 Outside the Visegrád countries close to the main EU15 border, the number of FDI projects virtually doubled 
in the CEECs after EU enlargement up to 2010, but by just five per cent in the Visegrád. 
16 In the case of service FDI, nearly every motive term differs significantly after enlargement for the EU15, but 
there are few significant changes in these for the CEECs, the education terms being an exception. 
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liberalization reduce FDI in the CEECs.  As noted above, it is consistent with other studies 
and reflects the less-developed nature of these economies.  The magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates for economic and political liberalization are much greater for the CEECs, and this 
may explain why the EU enlargement has a weaker effect for these countries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper makes several contributions, since not only does it offer systematic evidence on 
the role of the motives for FDI location derived from Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, by testing 
differences in these between the CEECs and EU15, but it explores how these motives change 
after the major EU enlargement event of the mid-2000s that integrated the CEECs.  There is a 
substantial literature on FDI location, but this has developed piecemeal, so that there are few 
studies including both the CEECs and EU15.  Further, much of this evidence is in the run-up 
to the accession, so that the effects of EU enlargement are relatively poorly understood.   
The current paper finds there are statistically significant differences in the motives.  In 
particular, greenfield FDI in the CEECs is an export-platform for the European market that 
seeks an uncongested location, good access and low-skilled labour, whereas in the EU15 the 
national market and high-skilled labour are significantly more important.  These differences 
exist for manufacturing, and they are apparent even if the southern or major European states 
are excluded as hosts, but less clear-cut for services.  Brownfield FDI locates differently in 
the case of an expansion of a plant’s primary function only, for which the European market is 
important throughout the EU25.  This is efficiency seeking from economies of scale. 
 As regards EU enlargement, the paper finds the surprising result that it substantially 
affects the FDI location motives in the EU15, but relatively little affects them in the CEECs.  
This could arise since the economic liberalization of the CEECs was on-going, both during 
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the 1990s and through the protracted accession process, although like some other studies we 
find that political and trade liberalization actually have a negative effect on FDI location in 
the CEECs, which differs from the EU15.  Notwithstanding this, we are unable to confirm the 
finding of Disdier and Mayer (2004) that the location choice is nested between the CEECs 
and EU15, possibly because we include a large number of explanatory variables, so that the 
unobserved effects are small.  Disdier and Mayer argue that the liberalization of the CEECs 
weakens the nesting effect, and this may be a further factor over our study period. 
 Finally, the differences in the FDI location motives found in this paper are ultimately 
likely to reflect the underlying disparities in economic development between the CEECs and 
EU15.  Of course, FDI is a key driver of development, but given these disparities the motives 
may not be readily amenable to policy intervention.  Nevertheless, it is the case that the FDI 
motives should not be treated as homogeneous between the new and existing Member States.  
While we find evidence that there is some narrowing in the FDI motives between these after 
enlargement (i.e., the European market matters more in the EU15 but less so in the CEECs, 
with FDI locating further eastwards), it is the case that they remain pronounced.  Since they 
reflect the disparities in economic development then they are also likely to persist.    
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Table 1: Project Characteristics by Mode  
 
Characteristics: All FDI Greenfield Brownfield Expansions Co-locations 
All projects 35,105 23,325  11,780 9,422 2,358 
EU15 host 
28,225 18,626 9,599 7,834 1,765 
(80.4%) (79.9%) (81.5%) (83.1%) (74.9%) 
 CEEC host 
6,880 4,699 2,181 1,588 593 
(19.6%) (20.1%) (18.5%) (16.9%) (25.1%) 
Manufacturing 
20,351 11,019 9,332 7,480 1,852 
(57.9%) (47.2%) (79.2%) (79.4%) (78.5%) 
Services 
10,497 8,890 1,607 1,301 306 
(29.9%) (38.1%) (13.6%) (13.8%) (13.0%) 
 EU15 origin 
15,823 10,204 5,619 4,547 1,072 
(45.1%) (43.7%) (47.7%) (48.3%) (45.5%) 
CEEC origin 
415 363 52 37 15 
(1.2%) (1.6%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.6%) 
Notes: Number of projects over 1997-2010.  Services exclude education & health, retail & hospitality and 
transport.  Origin excludes joint ventures that are in part from outside the EU15 and CEEC respectively.  
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Table 2: Results for the Greenfield FDI Location Choice 
 
Dependent variable: Location choice of greenfield FDI projects 
Sector: All Manufacturing Services 
EU25 host countries: CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 
Market seeking (M):       
Europe market potential 2.669*** [***] 0.864*** 3.458*** [***] 1.045*** 0.396 [-] 0.827*** 
National market size -0.135 [***] 0.497*** -0.008 [-] -0.136 0.171 [**] 1.219*** 
GDP growth rate 0.021*** [-] 0.012 0.033*** [**] 0.002 0.028** [-] 0.029** 
Population density -1.184*** [***] 0.107 -1.858*** [***] 0.668** -0.249 [-] -0.462 
Motorway density 0.493*** [***] 0.073*** 0.647*** [***] 0.081* 0.189 [-] -0.014 
Resource seeking (R):       
Tertiary education -0.044*** [***] 0.041*** -0.054*** [***] 0.038*** 0.017 [-] 0.046*** 
Secondary education -0.021** [***] 0.007*** -0.025** [**] 0.007** 0.023 [-] 0.003 
Wage rate -0.524** [-] -0.925*** -0.555** [-] -0.618** 0.942* [***] -1.137*** 
Labour market rigidity -0.040*** [-] -0.044*** -0.040*** [*] -0.064*** -0.048*** [***] -0.026** 
Corporate tax rate -0.034*** [**] -0.025*** -0.044*** [**] -0.032*** -0.026*** [-] -0.025*** 
Integration terms (I):       
EU membership 0.043 - 0.045 - 0.205 - 
Commitment to enlarge 0.405*** - 0.242** - 0.347* - 
Economic liberalization 0.020*** [***] 0.011*** 0.024*** [***] 0.013*** -0.006 [-] 0.013*** 
Political liberalization -0.034*** [***] 0.012*** -0.033*** [***] 0.009** -0.042*** [***] 0.019*** 
Trade liberalization -0.003 [***] 0.007*** -0.005* [***] 0.007*** -0.001 [-] 0.006*** 
Controls (C):       
Market volatility 0.005 [***] -0.013*** 0.003 [*] -0.011* 0.006 [-] -0.004 
Single currency 0.206* [***] -0.368*** 0.421*** [***] -0.320*** -0.097 [-] -0.481*** 
Foreign specialization 0.010*** [***] 0.089*** 0.097*** [-] 0.096*** 0.161*** [***] 0.052*** 
Domestic specialization 0.103*** [***] 0.178*** 0.017 [***] 0.132*** 0.472*** [***] 0.156*** 
Industrial diversity -0.006 [-] 0.014 0.023 [-] 0.023 -0.024 [-] 0.048** 
Market structure -0.996*** [-] -0.950*** -0.900*** [-] -0.771*** 0.322** [***] -0.689*** 
Structural Funds -0.058*** [***] 0.150*** -0.067*** [***] 0.199*** -0.056** [***] 0.137*** 
Areal size 1.440*** [***] 0.434*** 1.587*** [**] 1.058*** 0.951 [-] -0.205*** 
CEEC constant term 2.456 - 3.815 - -1.278 - 
Log-likelihood -60,668.2 -29,411.9 -21,507.9 
Wald statistic 24,424.8*** 9,538.3*** 12,124.0*** 
N observations (i projects) 583,125 (23,325) 275,475 (11,019) 222,250 (8,890) 
Notes: CLM regression of equation (2) with (1).  Variables defined in Appendix Table A.  Services exclude education & 
health, retail & hospitality and transport.  *** = 1%; ** = 5% and * = 10% significance level.  [***], [**] and [*] = 
significant between EU15 and CEECs, where [-] = no difference. 
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Table 3: Marginal Probability Effects  
 
Investment mode: Greenfield FDI Brownfield FDI 
Model / Type: CLM NLM Expansions Co-locations 
EU25 host countries: CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 
Market seeking (M):         
Europe market potential 2.56 0.83 2.43 0.57 2.83 2.14 - 0.60 
National market size - 0.48 - 0.52 0.77 1.03 - 1.30 
GDP growth rate 0.06 - 0.08 0.07 - 0.09 0.11 - 
Population density -1.14 - -1.64 - -2.70 -0.58 - -1.01 
Motorway density 0.47 0.07 0.57 0.21 0.73 0.13 - 0.23 
Resource seeking (R):         
Tertiary education -0.99 0.92 -1.49 0.78 -1.93 0.40 - 1.18 
Secondary education -1.02 0.34 -1.44 - -3.54 -0.39 - 1.25 
Wage rate -0.50 -0.89 -0.78 -0.33 - -1.48 2.09 -1.15 
Labour market rigidity -0.32 -0.35 -0.52 -0.49 - - - - 
Corporate tax rate -0.93 -0.68 -0.87 -0.75 -0.83 -0.75 -1.16 -0.89 
Notes: Marginal probability of FDI location expressed as an elasticity, (Pi / Pi) / (xi / xi), which is (1 - 
Pi)  if xi is logged, but (1 - Pi)  xi otherwise.  Evaluated at means, where ‘-’ is insignificant.  CLM and 
NLM with nine nests (see note 12) for all greenfield FDI in Table 2 and brownfield FDI in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Result for the Brownfield FDI Location Choice 
 
Dependent variable: Location choice of brownfield FDI projects 
Efficiency motive: Expansion Co-location 
EU25 host countries: CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 
Market seeking (M):     
Europe market potential 2.948*** [-] 2.227*** -0.174 [***] 0.622*** 
National market size 0.803*** [-] 1.075*** 0.633 [-] 1.358** 
GDP growth rate -0.007 [***] 0.033** 0.040* [*] -0.017 
Population density -2.809*** [***] -0.601** -0.685 [-] -1.052** 
Motorway density 0.756*** [***] 0.135*** 0.169 [-] 0.244*** 
Resource seeking (R):     
Tertiary education -0.087*** [***] 0.018*** 0.008 [-] 0.053*** 
Secondary education -0.073*** [***] -0.007* 0.010 [-] 0.026*** 
Wage rate 0.159 [***] -1.545*** 2.179*** [***] -1.194** 
Labour market rigidity -0.018 [*] 0.015 0.015 [-] 0.004 
Corporate tax rate -0.030*** [-] -0.027* -0.040*** [**] -0.032*** 
Integration terms (I):     
EU membership 0.413*** - 0.237  - 
Commitment to enlarge 0.056 - 1.042*** - 
Log-likelihood -28,496.8 
Wald statistic 14,116*** 
N observations (i projects) 294,500 (11,780) 
Notes: CLM regression of (2) with (1).  *** = 1%; ** = 5% and * = 10% significance 
level; [***], [**] and [*] = between CEECs and EU15 for each of expansions and co-
locations; [-] = no statistical difference.  Other terms in Table 2 included but not shown. 
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Table 5: Result for EU Enlargement 
 
Dependent variable: Location choice of greenfield FDI projects 
Sector: All 
EU25 host countries: CEECs EU15 
Sub-period: Pre-EU Post-EU Pre-EU Post-EU 
Market seeking (M):     
Europe market potential 3.648*** 2.448*** [-] 0.785*** 0.966*** [**] 
National market size -0.285 -0.750*** [**] 0.562*** 0.414* [***] 
GDP growth rate 0.025* -0.003 [*] 0.071*** -0.036*** [***] 
Population density -2.210*** -0.440 [**] 0.021 0.149 [***] 
Motorway density 0.632*** 0.533*** [-] 0.024 0.310*** [***] 
Resource seeking (R):     
Tertiary education -0.075*** -0.042** [-] 0.028*** 0.051*** [***] 
Secondary education -0.054*** -0.014 [*] -0.002 0.014*** [***] 
Wage rate 0.628 -0.746** [***] -0.041 -0.755*** [***] 
Labour market rigidity -0.066*** -0.060*** [-] -0.080*** -0.001 [***] 
Corporate tax rate -0.031*** -0.016** [-] -0.015*** -0.059*** [***] 
Integration terms (I):   
EU membership -0.057 - 
Commitment to enlarge 0.015 - 
Economic liberalization 0.018*** [***] 0.010*** 
Political liberalization -0.030*** [***] 0.012*** 
Trade liberalization -0.005** [**] 0.004*** 
Year 2004 onwards - -0.787* 
Log-likelihood -60,531.1 
Wald statistic 24,430*** 
N observations (i projects) 583,125 (23,325) 
Notes: CLM regression of (2) with (1).  *** = 1%; ** = 5% and * = 10% significance level; 
[***], [**] and [*] = between 'Pre-EU' and 'Post-EU', where commitment to enlarge for CEECs 
and 2004 for EU15; [-] = no statistical difference.  Controls included, but not shown. 
 26 
Figure 1: FDI in the EU15 and CEECs by Mode over Time 
 
 
Source: EIM dataset. 
 
 
Figure 2: Greenfield FDI by Sector over Time 
 
 
Source: EIM dataset. 
Note: Services exclude education & health, retail & hospitality and transport. 
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Appendix: The Nested Logit Model – Online Only 
 
The NLM specifies the probability of choosing country j as the product of the conditional 
probability of choosing j in nest S and the marginal probability of choosing nest S: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑆 =  
exp 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡
∑ exp 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠∈𝑆
 ×  
exp(𝜆𝑆 𝐼𝑉𝑆)
∑ exp(𝜆𝑆 𝐼𝑉𝑆)𝑆∈𝐽
 ,    
 
where the inclusive value  is the average profits from choosing nest S, 
and the dissimilarity parameter S measures the degree of dissimilarity between the unobserved 
portion of profits within a nest (Spies, 2010).  The correlation between the errors is 1 - S, so 
the countries in S are perfect substitutes if S = 0, but the NLM collapses to the CLM if S = 1.  
It is inconsistent with utility maximization if S < 0, but it may be locally consistent if S > 1 
(Herriges and Kling, 1996; Pusterla and Resmini, 2007).  It can be seen that nesting relaxes the 
IIA property since Pl / Pm will now also depends on the close substitute. 
This is known as the RU2 model, which is implemented by Stata.  If terms are included 
in IVS at a nest level for EU accession events the regression does not converge.  An alternative 
is a mixed-logit model in which the coefficients to have a random component (Belderbos et al., 
2014), but the density function is pre-specified and probabilities approximated by simulation.  
( ) = Ss istS xIV expln
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Appendix Table A: Data and Variables – Online Only 
 
No. Variable Description Sign 
Mean value 
CEECs EU15 
Market seeking (M):     
1 Europe market potential Gravity-weighted GDP of EU25 countries (log) – see expression (3).   + 3.5 3.6 
2 National market size 
GDP at constant prices, chain-linked volumes, reference year 2005 (at 
2005 exchange rates), expressed in millions of Euro (log).‡ 
+ 10.5 12.8 
3 GDP growth rate Growth rate of real GDP (national currency). + 3.8 2.2 
4 Population density Number of people per kilometer squared (log). + / - 1.4 1.4 
5 Motorway density Measured by km of motorways per 1000 km2 (log). + 1.5 2.8 
Resource seeking (R):     
6 Tertiary education Highest educational attainment of 25-64 year-olds at ISCED levels 5-6, %. + 20.7 25.1 
7 Secondary education Highest educational attainment of 25-64 year-olds at ISCED levels 3-4, %. + 63.7 42.0 
8 Wage rate† Hourly compensation cost in manufacturing at constant prices (log).‡  - 0.8 2.9 
9 Labour market rigidity Unemployed labour force aged 15+ and seeking employment, %. - 9.8 7.4 
10 Corporate tax rate Adjusted highest statutory rate of corporate income tax, %. - 23.3 31.7 
Integration terms (I):     
11 EU membership Dummy variable = 1 if CEEC is EU Member State; otherwise = 0. + 0.6 1.0 
12 Commitment to enlarge Dummy variable = 1 for Council of Ministers commitment; otherwise = 0. + 0.7 0.0 
13 Economic liberalization Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) for basket of 36 countries.‡ - 96.8 99.4 
14 Political liberalization Political risk rating index of country, 0 to 100, where 100 = no risk. + / - 75.9 85.2 
15 Trade liberalization Value of exports plus imports expressed as a ratio to GDP. - 96.2 66.7 
Controls (C):     
16 Foreign specialization 
Location quotient for the number of jobs in FDI projects in previous two 
years relative to EU25 as a whole, at the 2-digit industry level. 
+ 1.0 1.0 
17 Domestic specialization† Location quotient for employment relative to EU25 for 72 industries. + 0.8 1.0 
18 Industrial diversity 
Jacobs term for inverse sum of absolute differences in country and EU25 
industry shares based employment for 72 industries. 
+ 2.4 4.2 
19 Market structure† 
Herfindahl concentration index equal to sum of squares of the number of 
EIM FDI jobs in projects in previous two years at the 2-digit industry level.  
- 0.5 0.4 
20 Structural Funds EU Structural policy payments by Member State (log).‡  + / - 2.8 6.6 
21 Market volatility Absolute change in REER in previous year.‡ - 5.0 2.1 
22 Single currency Dummy variable = 1 if Euro is country’s national currency. + / - 0.1 0.7 
23 Physical areal size Kilometer squared (log). +  11.3 11.7 
Notes: Measured for each country and year.  Log = natural logs.  Expected signs. † Missing cases dummied out, including wage data for 
some CEECs, but these dummies are not reported. ‡ Deflator = price index, 2005 = 100, based on Euro or ECU currency prior to this. 
Sources: 1-5, 9, 13, 15, 20, 21 and 23: Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/); 6, 7: World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org); 8: 
ILS, US Bureau of Labor Statistics; 10: DG for Taxation, European Commission; 11-12: Christoffersen (2007); 14: International 
Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services Group, commercial dataset; 16, 19: European Investment Monitor FDI dataset; 17-18: 
KLEMS employment data (http://www.euklems.net); 22: Europa (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/money/euro_en). 
 35 
 
Appendix Table B: Correlation Matrix for Variables – Online Only 
 
 
Notes: ‡ Variable numbers given in Appendix Table A.   * Significant at the 5% level.  
 Variable number
‡    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 1.00                       
2 0.14* 1.00                      
3 -0.06* -0.20* 1.00                     
4 0.56* 0.22* -0.14* 1.00                    
5 0.58* 0.45* -0.18* 0.35* 1.00                   
6 0.19* 0.04* -0.07* -0.23* 0.22* 1.00                  
7 0.27* -0.17* 0.11* -0.25* -0.22* -0.27* 1.00                 
8 0.17* 0.83* -0.18* 0.03* 0.39* 0.22* -0.21* 1.00                
9 -0.29* -0.03* -0.03* -0.23* -0.32* -0.09* 0.15* -0.05* 1.00               
10 0.05* 0.43* -0.09* 0.39* 0.26* -0.15* -0.32* 0.38* 0.07* 1.00              
11 0.19* 0.43* -0.13* 0.53* 0.35* 0.23* -0.28* 0.49* -0.24* -0.03* 1.00             
12 0.03* -0.49* 0.16* -0.18* -0.36* -0.18* 0.58* -0.57* 0.17* -0.62* 0.86* 1.00            
13 0.13* 0.09* -0.21* -0.04* 0.11* 0.15* 0.02* 0.11* -0.15* -0.33* 0.32* 0.59* 1.00           
14 0.31* 0.34* -0.04* 0.12* 0.45* 0.15 -0.28* 0.52* -0.51* 0.27* -0.48* 0.42* 0.05* 1.00          
15 0.52* -0.41* 0.17* 0.19* 0.01 0.07* 0.32* -0.19* -0.05* -0.21* 0.42* -0.10* -0.07* 0.01* 1.00         
16 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.001 -0.01 -0.01 0.01* 0.01 1.00        
17 0.20* 0.17* -0.04* -0.03* 0.16* 0.07* 0.09* 0.24* -0.02* 0.05* -0.05* 0.17* 0.21* 0.08* -0.06* 0.10* 1.00       
18 0.25* 0.67* -0.40* 0.12* 0.45* 0.11* -0.04* 0.69* 0.06* 0.31* -0.33* 0.43* 0.35* 0.18* -0.22* 0.01 0.30* 1.00      
19 -0.08* -0.05* 0.01* -0.13* 0.03* -0.06* 0.10* -0.11* 0.07* -0.06* 0.10* -0.01* -0.05* 0.01* 0.05* 0.16* -0.02* -0.01* 1.00     
20 -0.02* 0.71* -0.19* 0.05* 0.34* 0.14 -0.35* 0.67* -0.06* 0.18* -0.22* 0.78* 0.27* 0.46* -0.15* -0.01* 0.17* 0.58* -0.01* 1.00    
21 -0.11* -0.13* -0.06* -0.13* -0.32* -0.16* 0.32* -0.22* 0.21* -0.16* 0.30* -0.18* -0.35* 0.01* 0.07* -0.01* 0.08* -0.21* 0.07* -0.29* 1.00   
22 0.14* 0.41* -0.16* 0.17* 0.44* 0.16* -0.41* 0.42* -0.19* 0.22* -0.44* 0.42* 0.41* 0.15* -0.37* -0.01 0.11* 0.42* 0.01* 0.48* -0.12* 1.00  
23 -0.46* 0.60* -0.10* -0.23* -0.30* -0.08* -0.08* 0.43* 0.31* 0.15* -0.13* -0.13* -0.18* 0.01* 0.11* -0.001 -0.04* 0.26* -0.06* 0.39* -0.54* -0.001 1.00 
 36 
Appendix Table C: Robustness Tests for Manufacturing Greenfield FDI - Online 
 
Dependent variable: Location choice of manufacturing greenfield FDI projects 
Source / host countries: EU25 source only+ Excl. Southern EU15 host Excl. Major EU15 host 
EU25 host countries: CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 
Market seeking (M):       
Europe market potential 3.425*** [***] 1.402*** 4.038*** [***] 2.253*** 3.865*** [***] -5.909*** 
National market size -0.226 [**] -1.416*** 0.506** [-] 0.194 0.064 [***] -1.739*** 
GDP growth rate 0.022** [***] -0.044*** 0.024*** [-] 0.009 0.040*** [***] 0.105*** 
Population density -1.560*** [***] 1.404*** -2.778*** [***] 1.161*** -2.231*** [***] 0.743* 
Motorway density 0.612*** [**] 0.267*** 0.608*** [***] -0.930*** 0.772*** [***] 1.881*** 
Resource seeking (R):       
Tertiary education -0.058*** [***] 0.021*** -0.045*** [***] 0.052*** -0.072*** [***] 0.031*** 
Secondary education -0.029* [-] -0.006 -0.020 [***] 0.033*** -0.040*** [**] -0.007 
Wage rate -0.995*** [**] 0.247 -0.486* [***] 1.559*** -0.697** [***] 3.986*** 
Labour market rigidity -0.050*** [***] -0.106*** -0.027*** [***] -0.101*** -0.039*** [***] -0.138*** 
Corporate tax rate -0.044*** [-] -0.033*** -0.052*** [***] -0.035*** -0.041*** [***] -0.070*** 
Integration terms (I):       
EU membership 0.175* - -0.131 - 0.079 - 
Commitment to enlarge 0.292** - 0.518*** - -0.200* - 
Economic liberalization 0.022*** [-] 0.015*** -0.020*** [-] -0.020*** -0.025*** [-] -0.016** 
Political liberalization -0.023** [-] -0.013** -0.031*** [***] 0.026*** -0.031*** [***] -0.060*** 
Trade liberalization -0.007** [***] 0.003 0.001 [**] 0.006*** -0.004* [***] 0.024*** 
Controls (C):       
Market volatility 0.003 [-] -0.003 -0.001 [**] -0.021*** 0.004 [-] 0.016 
Single currency 0.691*** [***] -0.336*** 0.470*** [***] -0.142** 0.348** [***] -0.204*** 
Foreign specialization 0.087*** [-] 0.096*** 0.099*** [**] 0.130*** 0.087*** [-] 0.050** 
Domestic specialization 0.014 [**] 0.150*** 0.022 [***] 0.136*** 0.048 [**] 0.124*** 
Industrial diversity 0.015 [-] 0.007 0.067* [-] 0.067*** -0.066 [-] -0.071** 
Market structure -0.711*** [-] -0.658*** -0.871*** [-] -0.717*** -0.898*** [-] -0.802*** 
Structural Funds -0.078*** [***] 0.231*** -0.070*** [-] -0.061 -0.066*** [***] 0.121** 
Areal size 1.690*** [-] 2.159*** 1.489*** [***] 1.041* 1.659*** [***] 0.983*** 
CEEC constant term 5.435 - 15.354 - -29.602*** - 
Log-likelihood -14,444.9 -25,026.0 -16,963.0 
Wald statistic 3,820.9*** 9,227.5*** 3,680.0*** 
N observations (i projects) 130,925 (5,237) 249,100 (9,964) 152,725 (6,109) 
Notes: CLM regression of equation (2) with (1).  The first regression is for ultimate owner of FDI originating from EU25 
only.  The last two regressions include all countries in the choice set but exclude the following hosts from the estimates to not 
bias the estimates: Southern EU15 = Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; and Major EU15 = France, Germany and UK.   + Joint 
ventures excluded where a partner is outside the CEECs or the EU15 respectively.  See notes to Table 2. 
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Appendix Table D: Robustness Tests for Brownfield FDI and EU Enlargement – Online Only 
 
Dependent variable:  Location choice of brownfield FDI projects Location choice of greenfield FDI projects 
Function / Sector: Production function Manufacturing  
Efficiency motive: Expansion Co-location Pre-EU Post-EU Pre-EU Post-EU 
EU25 host countries: CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 CEECs EU15 
Market seeking (M):         
Europe market potential 3.576*** [-] 2.411*** 1.487 [-] 0.800*** 7.053*** 4.485*** [**] 0.901*** 1.156*** [**] 
National market size 1.213*** [-] 0.474 0.741 [-] 0.848 0.113 -0.878*** [***] -0.328 -0.189 [***] 
GDP growth rate -0.007 [***] 0.077*** 0.034 [-] -0.034 0.008 0.012 [-] 0.054*** -0.043*** [***] 
Population density -3.686*** [***] 0.009 -1.866 [-] -0.476  -4.632***  -1.866 [***] 0.806*** 0.665** [*] 
Motorway density 0.880*** [***] -0.073 0.410 [-] 0.255 0.880*** 0.868*** [-] 0.067 0.359*** [***] 
Resource seeking (R):         
Tertiary education -0.093*** [***] 0.003 -0.019 [-] 0.050*** -0.104*** -0.079*** [-] 0.028*** 0.050*** [**] 
Secondary education -0.081*** [***] -0.013*** -0.009 [-] 0.034*** -0.078*** -0.052** [-] -0.001 0.014*** [**] 
Wage rate 0.096 [***] -1.568*** 1.982** [***] -1.267 -0.221 -1.396*** [***] -0.056 -0.369 [-] 
Labour market rigidity -0.003 [-] 0.012 0.022 [-] 0.031 -0.089*** -0.068*** [-] -0.098*** -0.012 [***] 
Corporate tax rate -0.030*** [-] -0.021*** -0.047*** [-] -0.033*** -0.060*** -0.016* [***] -0.022*** -0.065*** [***] 
Integration terms (I):       
EU membership 0.433*** - 0.185 - 0.089 - 
Commitment to enlarge -0.147 - 0.863*** - 3.738* - 
Year 2004 onwards - - - - - -2.500*** 
Log-likelihood -17,547.4 -29,318.8 
Wald statistic 8,211*** 9,556*** 
N observations (i projects) 179,450 (7,178) 275,475 (11,019) 
Notes: First regression repeats estimation in Table 4 for projects in production only, and second regression in Table 5 for manufacturing projects only. 
 
